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Tuesday, July 08, 2003
Nature
In my post on gay marriage from two weeks ago, I argued that conservatism may have the most fruitful debate on the matter, because liberalism is ill-equipped to understand marriage in any terms other than the rights of individuals. Since marriage is a form of social recognition, and it is unreasonable to demand how others recognize you, coming at the issue simply in the terms of individual rights is a non-starter. It is necessary for those arguing for recognition to convince others that they are indeed worthy of it.
I concluded that, on balance, the argument for recognition is persuasive, and that conservatives should support some form of union for gays, whether it be marriage or something like "civil union." In response, J. David Camm offered an important rejoinder that I want to consider more closely. In his last comment, he says the following:
Our primary argument therefore seems to revolve around the proper definition of nature. While you hold for a somewhat relativistic notion determined by the subject's level of bodily satisfaction, I appeal to an objective reality ordered toward human flourishing rationally considered. The normative understanding of nature, as in Aristotle's conception, was based on the observable phenomenon that all forms of being have teloi. While physical satisfaction or pleasure might be a positive side effect of pursuing the telos, it is not a necessary or essential component. A nature ordered according to satisfaction is always subject to revision while a nature ordered to the human good, rational activity of the soul in accordance with virtue, is constant from generation to generation.
David raises the question of nature, and considers it relevant to the question of the moral status of homosexuality. One response (as seen by a comment left by someone else) is to suggest that the concept of human nature is an arbitrary one used to promote particular values, i.e., whatever is conventional seems natural. That is not my response, so I want to explore the concept of nature a little and try to show why I think it is consistent with my position on the issue of homosexuality.
In affirming the notion of a human nature, I would assert the following:
1. That what is good for us is rooted in our biology. Contrary to the Marxist vision, human beings are not utterly plastic.
2. While there may be important variations within the species, what is a good for one person is generally a good for all. These goods can be discerned from experience. Taking these two statements together, we can say that there is an objective human nature.
3. That there is a human nature should not be taken to mean necessarily that human beings reach their potential "naturally," i.e., without intervention. Culture cultivates; just as agriculture can develop crops that are bigger and stronger than their ancestors in the wild, so human culture can help develop human beings to reach the fulfillment of their nature. Corrupt culture, likewise, can stunt human development.
I won't pretend that I have proven any of this, nor that any of these in and of themselves decide very much. Everyone will grant that biology matters to some extent. The questions therefore are in what way and to what extent, and these must be argued for on a case by case basis.
When David says that I am holding "for a somewhat relativistic notion determined by the subject's level of bodily satisfaction," he is referring to statements of mine like the following: "my experience does not suggest that gay people are especially unhappy except insofar as they are excluded from various parts of society." In saying this, however, I am not establishing pleasure as the ultimate standard of morality; I am engaging in the empirical task of trying to answer the question of nature. Aren't pleasure and pain fairly reliable signs of the health or distress of an organism? If gay people report to us straights that they are really ok being gay, and our observations of their life don't suggest anything too different, what other evidence are we going to find to suggest that homosexuality is something bad for them? Pleasure may be a "side effect" of good living, as both David and Aristotle would say, but it is one well worth paying attention to. Moreover, Aristotle would make the stronger point that a life without pleasure is not a happy (or "flourishing") one, regardless of its other accomplishments.
The teleological argument about reproduction doesn't seem to me to be able to bear the weight that is being placed upon it. Surely reproduction is fundamental to our survival as a species, and the sex act is how our species pulls reproduction off. Accordingly, sex as reproduction surely deserves respect and protection. It is characteristic of human culture, however, to take activities fundamental to our animal nature and transform them into activities that reinforce social bonds, and there is remarkable flexibility in how that happens. Eating everywhere is a social activity, but there are enough differences in cultural (and subcultural) practices to make a person nervous in a foreign environment. Likewise, sex is generally used to strengthen intimacy. This function can assist the reproductive function of sex, but it is hard to see why it must, just as sometimes people eat to be social even when they are not really hungry.
Eddie 4:45 PM
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